

BLACK POWER

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28th February 1968

BLACK POWER
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

INTRODUCTION

In the report at Annex we outline the origins and aims of Black Power and examine its likely impact on the coloured populations of Britain and the Caribbean, in particular the British Commonwealth Territories (including the British Associated States and the British dependent territories). We assess the extent to which it could affect race relations in Britain and give rise to new threats to British interests. Finally we consider the possibility of its developing as an international movement and of its being exploited by the communists.

2. By Black Power we mean an extremist racist movement advocating physical violence as a means of enabling coloured communities to secure dominant political and social status, rather than the simple achievement by coloured people of positions of authority and influence. We have in mind the pattern of action first called for by American negro extremists.

3. We conclude that:

- (a) Black Power feeds on the wide range of negro social, economic and racial disabilities in the United States which it will take many years to remove. Though there is little likelihood of Black Power assuming major proportions in American politics, Black Power leaders will do all they can to exploit and perhaps provoke urban disorders (paragraphs 3-11);
- (b) Black Power advocates have so far made little headway among coloured people in Britain and seem unlikely to do so in the next few years (paragraphs 12-21);

- (c) in the 1970s, however, British-born coloured school leavers will form a sizeable proportion of the young community in several major industrial areas, and if they are denied equality of treatment will form educated and frustrated minority groups upon which a Black Power movement could base itself (paragraph 22);
- (d) Black Power has made little impact in Commonwealth Caribbean countries, where its message is largely irrelevant. But in many of them social and economic discontent is rife, and the apparently successful use of violence in the USA to highlight poverty and social disability may increasingly tempt extremist opposition leaders in Caribbean Commonwealth countries to adopt similar methods, even where there are black governments (paragraphs 24-34);
- (e) Black Power is unlikely to develop into a coherent international movement (paragraph 36);
- (f) though communists will be alert to chances of exploiting the subversive possibilities offered by Black Power, the Moscow-oriented parties will fight shy of any deliberate involvement in the movement. But Peking-oriented communists will no doubt continue to make play with the analogies between Maoist and Black Power tactics of fomenting revolution (paragraphs 37-41).

(Signed) DENIS GREENHILL
Chairman, on behalf of the
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

28th February 1968.

BLACK POWER

INTRODUCTION

In this report we outline the origins and aims of Black Power and examine its likely impact on the coloured populations of Britain and the Caribbean, in particular the British Commonwealth Territories (including the British Associated States and the British dependent territories). We assess the extent to which it could give rise to new threats to British interests and affect race relations in Britain. Finally we consider the possibility of its developing as an international movement and of its being exploited by the communists.

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BLACK POWER IN THE UNITED STATES

3. Till the emergence of Black Power the American Civil Rights Movement was multi-racial both in its objective of securing the proper integration of the negro into American society and in the broad spectrum of its membership. Dissatisfaction with the rate of negro advancement, publicly expressed by extremists in the movement, was often shared by the main body of the Civil Rights Movement itself; but the moderate leadership failed to see that the passing of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 did not get to the root of the urban negro problem.

4. The term Black Power was coined by Stokely Carmichael, one of the more prominent extremists, in mid-1966 when he became national Chairman of the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) which previously had been a non-violent Civil Rights movement. By the end of the summer of 1967 Black Power organisations had established themselves in the vanguard of the struggle for negro advancement and, when major crises occurred, the moderate elements were seen to be powerless to influence events.

5. Black Power is ill-financed and not effectively organised as a disciplined movement, while its methods are pragmatic and opportunist rather than systematic. The Black Power leaders have achieved prominence as much by the exploitation of real social and economic issues as by their own initiatives and organisational drive. They have exploited the major urban riots which have swept the country since August 1965 by playing on economic, social and political grievances which were undoubtedly ingredients in many of the incidents. The Black Power leaders have claimed that only by Vietnam-style guerilla warfare can America "be brought to its knees" (Carmichael).

6. Basically, Black Power is apartheid in reverse. Its objectives have been variously defined as inter alia the establishment of a separate negro state; a Black Administration and a Black President of the United States; Black control of cities in proportion to negro numerical strength; and even the total destruction of America's present social organisation (advocated by Rap Brown, national chairman of SNCC). One important consequence of the racist nature of these objectives has been that many liberal whites, who previously took an active part in the negro cause, have been not only antagonised but often deliberately pushed aside by Black Power activists. At the same time, a large section of white opinion which used to be indifferent is now openly hostile to negro advancement, and the "white backlash" is one symptom of this reaction. Moreover the President and his Administration have said that illegitimate and unconstitutional methods of pursuing the negro cause will not be tolerated; this may further polarise white and extremist black attitudes.

7. The most important organisations pursuing Black Power policies are -
- (a) the small Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), which has a membership of not more than fifty, is pro-Chinese communist, and advocates guerilla warfare as a means of attaining the revolutionary overthrow of the United States government and the subsequent establishment of a negro government;
 - (b) the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) which, under the influence of Stokely Carmichael, has become an extremist militant body with some informal communist contacts; it advocates direct action and violence against both whites and the more affluent negroes, Carmichael's interpretation of the Black Power slogan being to "bring the United States to its knees" and to use any force necessary to achieve negro aims. Apart from 100 full-time activists, its membership has diminished since 1966 and is now of insignificant proportions; it is in serious financial straits;

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- (c) the militant but less extreme Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) led by Floyd B. McKissick, which lays emphasis on negro separatism based on a policy of militancy. Its leadership includes negroes of Caribbean origin; its membership is believed to be about 5,000;
- (d) the Nation of Islam (NOI), better known as the Black Muslims, a pseudo-Islamic and non-communist body with military-style discipline and about 5,000 members, which relies for support mainly on uneducated negroes, rejects as hypocritical the United States Government's offer of integration and seeks the separation of whites and blacks. Its main significance is in the propaganda field as it has no formal association or involvement with the Civil Rights Movement.

8. The influence Black Power has achieved was reflected in the so-called National Black Power conference held at Newark, New Jersey, in July 1967, which was attended by 600-700 delegates representing forty-five negro organizations. All whites (including the press) were formally excluded from working sessions. Extremists set the tone of the proceedings, which are believed to have included expression of violent anti-white sentiments. Some sort of alliance between negro extremist elements seems to have developed, and certainly the prestige of the moderate leaders suffered a further blow.

9. A minority of 200-300 militant negro extremists also dominated the "National Conference on New Politics" which was held in Chicago in September 1967 and attended by 2,000 white delegates as well as negroes. Its intended aim was to unite Black Power, anti-Vietnam and left-wing student and other elements in a political party with a Presidential candidate. In practice Black Power speakers, having deliberately humiliated the white participants, secured the right to represent half the voting strength at the conference and a number of extremist, including anti-white, resolutions were passed.

10. Since 1959 the Communist Party of the USA has, doubtless for fear of alienating its already small band of white working class supporters, stopped advocating policies which could be interpreted as support for Black Power. There have however been some contacts with communists, especially on the part of Stokely Carmichael; and a CPUSA announcement in late 1967 (see paragraph 37 below) suggests that the party is to some extent trying to hedge its bets.

11. Black Power feeds on a wide range of social, economic and racial disabilities, ranging from ghetto conditions to the allegedly excessive numbers of negro soldiers sent to Vietnam, though even if these disabilities were removed the Black Power leaders would no doubt continue to seek personal power through demagogic and irresponsible methods. The slogan is likely to find adherents among the negro population until the Administration as well as State and municipal governments can tangibly demonstrate their willingness and ability to give the negro a radically new deal and remove various forms of discrimination. The obstacles to the latter are such that, despite the very considerable efforts of the present Administration, we must for some years to come expect violence and anarchy to break out in American cities, particularly during the summer. Black Power is bound to exert an indirect influence on American politics, for example by encouraging election platforms urging stronger police action and/or greater expenditure on social programmes. But there is little likelihood of Black Power assuming major proportions as an influence in American politics. Black Power leaders can nevertheless be expected to do all they can to exploit and perhaps provoke urban disorders.

BLACK POWER IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

12. Britain's coloured population now amounts to about one million, of which roughly one-fifth were born in this country. The numbers will continue to rise and (though forecasting is difficult) could reach about 3 million by the end of the century.

13. The conditions in which many immigrants to Britain live bear some resemblance to those affecting the negroes in the USA and overcrowding and shortage of housing and of schools could provide a breeding ground for extremism and violence. West Indians, who form about half the coloured population of Britain, may be less deeply imbued with a sense of an inferior status than the negroes of the USA and therefore less likely to see in revolutionary violence a solution for their problems. Moreover, Black Power orators seeking to advocate such a solution would so far seem to have made little headway with the broad mass of coloured opinion in Britain, while the Race Relations Act is likely to limit their ability to work in this direction. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to assume that West Indian immigrants are immune to the traditional sense of grievance which inspires the US negro or that the additional handicap of unfamiliarity with their new surroundings is not capable of contributing to a climate of opinion liable to respond to the Black Power message, whatever limitations there may be on its public expression.

14. As long ago as 1964 Michael de Freitas (see paragraph 15 below) tried to set up an organisation in this country resembling the NOI, but he has had no success with it. It was not until Stokely Carmichael, Chairman of the SNCC, visited this country last July that the idea of Black Power first attracted widespread publicity and attention not only amongst the white population, but amongst the coloured immigrants themselves.

15. So far its appeal has been limited to a small number of West Indians and Black Africans and to an even smaller number of Indians and of the extremists among them now seeking to exploit it the most active are -

(a) Michael de Freitas
alias Michael 'X'

A West Indian born in 1933, of mixed European and negro blood and permanently resident in the United Kingdom for the last ten years.

(b) Roy Sawh

A West Indian, born in 1934 and resident in the United Kingdom for most of the last ten years.

(c) "Johnny" James

A West Indian, born in 1926 and resident in the United Kingdom since 1959. A prolific writer, with extreme, militant pro-Chinese views.

(d) Benedict Obi Egbuna

A Nigerian, born in 1936 and resident in the United Kingdom since 1957, first as a student and subsequently as a novelist and playwright.

16. The main mouthpieces for the spreading of Black Power views in this country are -

- (i) the Racial Action Adjustment Society (RAAS);
- (ii) the Universal Coloured People's Association (UCPA).

17. RAAS. Founded by de Freitas and Sawh in 1965, its aims are the promotion of the economic, social and cultural welfare of coloured people in the United Kingdom and the strengthening of their links with the Afro-Asian-Caribbean peoples. It has only existed on paper and its main manifestation has been Sawh's militant oratory at Speaker's Corner.

18. UCPA. Sawh announced the formation of this organisation at Speaker's Corner last June, but it now appears to be run by a group of coloured extremists, led by Obi Egbuna. Its aims are similar to those of RAAS and it has issued a lengthy, rabidly anti-white manifesto expressing support for Black Power. It claims a membership of about 800 but the real figure is believed to be about forty. According to a press report, it calls itself the British equivalent of SNCC, but there is no evidence of any effective link between the two bodies.
19. In addition, the Campaign against Racial Discrimination (CARD) has recently received a great deal of publicity in the context of Black Power. This was founded in 1965 as a multi-racial and moderate organisation for the promotion of good race relations. It claims about 2,500 members (both coloured and white, although the latter are believed to be in a minority) and hitherto its policies have been practical and moderate rather than extremist. It has not been particularly effective and recently has been rent by internal dissension. Its current executive leadership includes a variety of extremist elements; their policies will probably be militant, but it is unlikely that Black Power will play a predominant part in CARD's activities in the near future.
20. None of the principal Black Power protagonists in Britain seem to have any real capacity for leadership and none of them have succeeded in attracting significant support amongst the coloured minority. They seem unwilling or unable to work together in a common cause. De Freitas was sentenced in late 1967 to a short term of imprisonment under the Race Relations Act. It is still too early to say whether this will have the effect of giving him the benefit of martyrdom or leading to his permanent succession by other leaders. But, as the Black Power message depends so much on the whipping up of race hatred and mass hysteria rather than on the logical exposition of concrete aims, it is difficult, given the Race Relations Act, to see how he or any other spokesman can now make much public headway. However, we can expect Black Power extremists in Britain to propagate their views energetically behind the scenes and to seize any opportunity available to them of drawing public attention to their ideas.

21. The overwhelming weight of opinion among the coloured population still seems to be in favour of practical and specific efforts to remove, in collaboration with official and unofficial British organisations, such disabilities as they at present suffer. It does not seem to favour a black-white confrontation of the kind Black Power supporters call for. This attitude seems unlikely to change in the next few years.

22. Later, however, a different situation may arise, especially if the policy of moderation proves patently unsuccessful and if the situation is aggravated by the continued flow of coloured immigrants. The 1970s will see emerging from the schools many coloured youngsters who will be entirely the product of our own educational system and environment, speaking with local accents and largely indistinguishable from their white contemporaries except by the colour of their skin. Because immigrants have settled in not more than about sixty of our towns and cities, these "coloured English men and women" will form a sizeable proportion of the young community in each area. Unlike their parents they will expect full equality of treatment, jobs appropriate to their skills and the opportunity to buy decent houses. If these are denied them through prejudice or for any other reason they will form educated and frustrated minority groups who are unable to break out of their substandard environment and may turn in on themselves in opposition to the white community. Such groups, quite apart from being obvious targets for communist subversion, may spontaneously develop pro-black and anti-white attitudes which, even without outside influences, could turn into some form of Black Power movement which would threaten the stability of society in certain major industrial areas. At Appendix is a table showing the minimum numbers of coloured school leavers expected to enter the labour market during the next few years.

23. Some exponents of Black Power in Britain have had contacts with communists. A few have even been members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), but most have left the party or been expelled from it in recent years. The CPGB itself, while opposed to any form of discrimination against coloured immigrants, is actively opposed to racialism of the kind advocated by Black Power.

BLACK POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN

Commonwealth Countries

24. Direct interest in the Black Power concept in these countries has so far been very limited, primarily because its message is irrelevant in most of them since they have coloured governments and the larger

ones are already independent. The only attention it appears to have aroused is among a few left-wing extremists in Bermuda, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad. There are some signs that the SNCC may be seeking to promote contacts in these and other Caribbean countries, and some of the many West Indian students in the United States may return home infected with Black Power ideas.

25. It is also possible that Black Power leaders may seek to establish bases of operations in the Caribbean to escape United States justice rather than to start local movements. This could have local effects and might prejudice the relations of the government of the country concerned with the USA. In the following paragraphs we examine countries where Black Power as a concept might affect the inter-racial situation.

26. Bermuda. The Progressive Labour Party of Bermuda (PLP(B)) is a small left-wing predominantly negro party which holds two of the thirty-six seats in the Bermuda House of Assembly. It first established contact with negro elements in the American Civil Rights movement early in 1967 and in July sent representatives to the National Black Power conference at Newark, New Jersey. Subsequently some of its leaders publicly adopted a more vitriolic attitude towards the white governing class in Bermuda, and favoured adopting the Black Power slogan as the basis for their campaign in the 1968 elections, but the PLP(B) have now apparently gone cool on the Black Power concept as it seems not to be a vote-winner. Bermuda does, however, have some of the ingredients conducive to the growth of Black Power, and the PLP(B) might in due course revert to a Black Power platform if it seemed advantageous to do so.

27. Jamaica. Black racist organisations proliferated in Jamaica before independence, but only the Rastafarians and the African Reform Church, which has Rastafarian connections, are significant now. Nevertheless, many Jamaicans are poor and under-privileged; they could well be receptive to the Black Power message of extremism and physical violence if they were given a lead. However, the authorities are alert to this danger and have declared Stokely Carmichael, Rap Brown and James Foreman, all leading members of SNCC, prohibited immigrants.

...is relatively small. Unlike Jamaica, the under-privileged for black racialism, and a resolution opposing Black Power and supporting the Government's actions in declaring Stokely Carmichael a prohibited immigrant was recently passed unanimously at a conference of the ruling party. The authorities are confident that there is little danger of serious Black Power activity.

29. Barbados. A left-wing political movement, the People's Popular Movement (PPM), founded in 1966, espouses the Black Power cause and publishes a newspaper 'Black Star' which reflects this. There are as yet no indications that the PPM is likely to attract a significant following or that the 'Black Star' has a wide readership. The Barbados Government are satisfied that neither poses any real threat to race relations in Barbados.

30. Guyana. Mr. Burnham, leader of the governing People's National Congress (PNC), is basically opposed to Stokely Carmichael and can be expected to restrict any attempt by him to proselytise in Guyana. And although the East Indian opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) may share some of Carmichael's views, e.g. on Vietnam-style guerilla warfare, they are unlikely to wish to be associated with Black Power since it is essentially a negro movement. However, there are signs that the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), which is supported by young extremist Africans in the PNC, has begun to pursue a policy of intimidation against the East Indians. ASCRIA may have been behind the theft of arms from the Guyana Defence Force in November 1967.

31. British Honduras. There have been indications recently that Goldson, the leader of the opposition National Independence Party (NIP) is seeking to turn the present political discord into an inter-racial conflict. He might conceivably succeed in exacerbating the differences between Premier Price and the Indians and Mestizos on the one side and himself, the negroes and people of negroid extraction (representing about 60 per cent of the population) on the other. In doing this he would have no scruples as to the methods he used, and he might be tempted to take a leaf out of the Black Power book.

32. Nation of Islam (NOI). Contacts between individuals in various Caribbean countries and the Black Muslim movement in the United States go back as far as 1957, although NOI does not seek actively to develop external support. Since then some active members of the American movement have visited some parts of the area. There are now or have been NOI groups within Bahamas, Bermuda, Jamaica, British Honduras, Trinidad and Guyana. None of them, however, has flourished. Their organisation

remains rudimentary, their financial resources negligible and their membership small (in the Bahamas it has not exceeded 30, in Bermuda 100-200 and Guyana possibly 350). Although the leaders of the Guyanese and British Honduras groups have been in touch with the NOI leadership in the USA, there is no sign of any close formal co-operation between either of these groups and the movement in the USA. The other three groups appear to have no regular contacts with the American movement. At present it seems unlikely that NOI will have any significant influence in the area.

Non-Commonwealth Countries

33. We have no evidence of any real interest in the Black Power concept in non-Commonwealth Caribbean countries, or of any close ties between figures associated with the concept in the United States and these countries. Stokely Carmichael (of the SNCC) attended the meeting of the Organisation of Latin America Solidarity (OLAS) which was held last July-August in Havana. A group from Trinidad and representatives of the PPP of Guyana also attended. During the conference Carmichael sought to associate negro extremist activity in the United States with the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle called for by many other participants and this was endorsed by a Conference resolution. Castro is not one to miss a chance of making full use of any politically disruptive element in the imperialist camp, but the fact that racial hatred, abhorrent to the Cubans, figures so largely in Black Power thinking, and the danger of being accused of letting United States interests take priority over Latin American ones, may deter him from outright support and exploitation of the movement. We would expect him rather to watch for a while to see how much momentum the movement develops before deciding what degree of support to give it. But there is still a possibility that Cuba will give revolutionary training to Black Power activists from the United States.

Prospects

34. At present Black Power has little potential as a political influence in Commonwealth Caribbean countries as a whole; the opposition parties in them have for the most part been content to rely on constitutional methods. But economic and social discontent is rife in many of them and it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which failure to solve key domestic issues (e.g. housing, education and medical facilities) and to raise the standard of living could lead to pressures for direct, radical action from the less privileged sections of the population. They might in view of the apparent success in the USA of violent methods of highlighting issues of poverty and social disability, adopt similar methods even against black governments, especially in countries where the presence of different races complicates and embitters the distinctions between privileged and under-privileged. In Guyana, in particular, where inter-communal violence has

occurred in the past, something of this kind could happen, given the fact that the negro community is out-numbered by the East Indian, and the possibility that the predominantly East Indian People's Progressive Party might return to power. The development of contacts between Black Power militants in the USA and opposition parties or groups in Caribbean countries would increase the risk of this happening. However, in all Caribbean Commonwealth countries the authorities appear to be well aware of this potential threat.

35. A further, though remote, possibility is that if an acute inter-racial situation arose in Britain and the authorities were obliged to take strong action which the coloured minorities construed as intolerable persecution, Commonwealth Caribbean countries, with their close and numerous family ties with immigrants in Britain, might see attraction in Black Power tactics as a means of retaliation. With local public opinion inflamed, these governments, anxious to display their solidarity with their black brothers, might well adopt anti-white Black Power-type attitudes, with for instance adverse effects for British commercial interests in the Caribbean. But as paragraphs 19 to 22 show, circumstances that could lead to such a situation are most unlikely to arise in the next few years.

BLACK POWER AS AN INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

36. Black Power speakers in the United States frequently make much of Black Power as one arm of an international movement embracing all the coloured peoples of the world, struggling for liberation from the domination of the white races and for an end to the exploitation of the under-developed by the developed countries. Thus "anti-imperialism", "anti-Zionism" and support for North Vietnam are essential parts of the Black Power message despite their irrelevance to the local situations, and this may be one reason for the support given to the negro revolt by some opponents of the United States involvement in Vietnam. It is also quite possible that, for example, Africans in South Africa may find some inspiration in American Black Power activities. But the evidence suggests that American negro extremists have taken up foreign policy issues not on their merits but as a means of challenging the Administration for their own purposes. There is no sign of the development of anything approaching a coherent international movement.

COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION

37. Soviet propaganda organs have exploited racial violence in the United States and made the most of the very evident difficulties with which President Johnson and the United States Administration have been confronted. But there is no sign that Moscow has given any moral or material support to Black Power activities; the only Soviet overt action has been acceptance of the visit of some members of the SNCC to Moscow, and the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) has not taken a consistent position over Black Power. Party organisations have on occasion raised funds for the SNCC and have also arranged visits to the USSR for some SNCC member, some of whom are communists. In 1959 the party abandoned the idea of self-determination and a separate state for American negroes and began stressing the need for the participation in the negroes' struggle of "the broad strata of the white masses". The party has given no comprehensive support for the extremists, whose racist aims and violent tactics it clearly finds embarrassing; indeed it has denounced the Nation of Islam (NOI) as an ultra-reactionary body. However, in November 1967 the CPUSA announced publicly that the negroes had a right "to use violence to free themselves from oppression". It will no doubt go on trying to have it both ways.

38. The British Communist Party (CPGB) has approached Black Power very warily. Their opposition to the Black Power concept is consistent with CPGB's aim of spreading its influence among the British working class, some sectors of which find it difficult enough to accept the idea of immigrants taking jobs in Britain, and would certainly react very strongly against the communists if they were seen to have endorsed the demands of the Black Power activities.

39. Peking has made even more use than Moscow of the events of last summer in the United States to castigate official American policy and to endorse the extremists' demands. But none of the prominent Black Power leaders have visited Peking and the Chinese Government seems to have no coherent plans for directly supporting Black Power. Robert Williams, self-styled leader-in-exile of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) in the United States, is now based in Peking and broadcasts vitriolic and anti-American propaganda with support for Black Power activities such as urban guerilla warfare, which is superficially consistent with Maoist doctrine. In 1963 (when he was still in Cuba) he succeeded in eliciting a personal message of sympathy and support from Mao Tse-tung. But we believe Peking will go no further than giving propaganda support to anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism as backing Black Power.

37. Soviet propaganda organs have exploited racial violence in the United States and made the most of the very evident difficulties with which President Johnson and the United States Administration have been confronted. But there is no sign that Moscow has given any moral or material support to Black Power activities; the only Soviet overt action has been acceptance of the visit of some members of the SNCC to Moscow, and the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) has not taken a consistent position over Black Power. Party organisations have on occasion raised funds for the SNCC and have also arranged visits to the USSR for some SNCC member, some of whom are communists. In 1959 the party abandoned the idea of self-determination and a separate state for American negroes and began stressing the need for the participation in the negroes' struggle of "the broad strata of the white masses". The party has given no comprehensive support for the extremists, whose racist aims and violent tactics it clearly finds embarrassing; indeed it has denounced the Nation of Islam (NOI) as an ultra-reactionary body. However, in November 1967 the CPUSA announced publicly that the negroes had a right "to use violence to free themselves from oppression". It will no doubt go on trying to have it both ways.

38. The British Communist Party (CPGB) has approached Black Power very warily. Their opposition to the Black Power concept is consistent with CPGB's aim of spreading its influence among the British working class, some sectors of which find it difficult enough to accept the idea of immigrants taking jobs in Britain, and would certainly react very strongly against the communists if they were seen to have endorsed the demands of the Black Power activities.

39. Peking has made even more use than Moscow of the events of last summer in the United States to castigate official American policy and to endorse the extremists' demands. But none of the prominent Black Power leaders have visited Peking and the Chinese Government seems to have no coherent plans for directly supporting Black Power. Robert Williams, self-styled leader-in-exile of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) in the United States, is now based in Peking and broadcasts vitriolic and anti-American propaganda with support for Black Power activities such as urban guerilla warfare, which is superficially consistent with Maoist doctrine. In 1963 (when he was still in Cuba) he succeeded in eliciting a personal message of sympathy and support from Mao Tse-tung. But we believe Peking will go no further than giving propaganda support to anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism as backing Black Power.

40. In the United States the small numbers of pro-Peking communists are more concerned with fomenting protest against the Vietnam war and against the Administration's "failure" to satisfy the Civil Rights Movement than to take a lead in support of Black Power. There is as yet no evidence that any of them have been trained in the techniques of terrorism and sabotage by the Chinese Government, or that such people were active in the urban riots and arson last summer. But the coincidence between Mao's belief in guerilla warfare as a means of seizing political power and the Black Power techniques of violence and physical action could mean that Peking's brand of communism may gain ground among Black Power advocates both in the United States and in the Caribbean.

41. In Britain the Chinese Diplomatic Mission has made contacts with some West Indians and Indians; there has been no other sign of official Chinese interest in race relations in Britain. There are, however, pro-Peking communists on the Black Power fringe in Britain who are apparently seeking to exploit the Black Power concept for communist purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

42. We conclude that:

- (a) Black Power feeds on the wide range of negro social, economic and racial disabilities in the United States which it will take many years to remove. Though there is little likelihood of Black Power assuming major proportions in American politics, Black Power leaders will do all they can to exploit and perhaps provoke urban disorders (paragraphs 3-11);
- (b) Black Power advocates have so far made little headway among coloured people in Britain and seem unlikely to do so in the next few years (paragraphs 12-21);
- (c) in the 1970s, however, British-born coloured school leavers will form a sizeable proportion of the young community in several major industrial areas, and if they are denied equality of treatment will form educated and frustrated minority groups upon which a Black Power movement could base itself (paragraph 22);
- (d) Black Power has made little impact in Commonwealth Caribbean countries, where its message is largely irrelevant. But in many of them social and economic discontent is rife, and the

apparently successful use of violence in the USA to highlight poverty and social disability may increasingly tempt extremist opposition leaders in Caribbean Commonwealth countries to adopt similar methods, even where there are black governments (paragraphs 24-34);

- (e) Black Power is unlikely to develop into a coherent international movement (paragraph 36);
- (f) though communists will be alert to chances of exploiting the subversive possibilities offered by Black Power, the Moscow-oriented parties will fight shy of any deliberate involvement in the movement. But Peking-oriented communists will no doubt continue to make play with the analogies between Maoist and Black Power tactics of fomenting revolution (paragraphs 37-41).

IMMIGRANT PUPILS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

The table below, which shows the numbers of coloured immigrant children at school in England and Wales, by age, in January 1967, gives some idea of the minimum number of coloured school leavers expected to enter the labour market during the next few years. The table is not complete because -

- (a) information is not available for immigrant pupils in schools with fewer than ten immigrants on roll;
- (b) it does not include coloured children born in England or Wales whose parents immigrated more than ten years ago;
- (c) it does not include the considerable number of new arrivals since January 1967 and it is not possible to give meaningful predictions of new arrivals during the next few years.

Maintained Primary and
Secondary Schools

IMMIGRANT PUPILS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

January 1967

Age of Pupil Pupils from:	11		12		13		14		15		16 and over		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Africa	238	213	240	180	215	162	224	146	177	152	276	155	1,370	1,008
India	1,552	1,226	1,755	1,176	1,794	1,087	1,930	1,086	1,307	743	706	502	9,044	5,820
Pakistan	701	266	889	278	952	217	993	171	533	114	192	124	4,260	1,170
West Indies	2,221	2,562	2,013	2,470	1,985	2,331	1,849	2,233	1,379	1,835	729	1,333	10,176	12,764
Total	4,712	4,267	4,897	4,104	4,946	3,797	4,996	3,636	3,396	2,844	1,903	2,114	24,850	20,762

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